According to the Principle of Charity, we ought to interpret each other charitably. That is, we ought to adopt the interpretation that shows the interpreted person in the best light. The Principle of Charity is motivated by appealing to a harm asymmetry: it is worse (the thought goes) to mistakenly criticize someone than to fail to rightfully criticize them. This chapter argues that in oppressive contexts, charity is not enough. First, the Principle of Charity is myopic. Charitable interpretation only considers (...) harm to the person being interpreted and ignores third party harms. Second, under conditions of oppression, our conceptual resources and evidential standards will be systematically biased against marginalized perspectives. So charitable interpretations will overlook harm to marginalized persons. Finally, the chapter give a diagnosis of the Principle of Charity: It misunderstands the interpersonal interpretive aim. The interpersonal interpretive aim is to interpret one another in a way that accurately captures the normative features that are crucial to our interpersonal relationships. What we need is not a Principle of Charity, but an Aim of Justice. The chapter’s conclusion explains what an Aim of Justice would require of us, notably, empathetic engagement and intellectual humility. (shrink)

Sometimes it is practically beneficial to believe what is epistemically unwarranted. Philosophers have taken these cases to raise the question are there practical reasons for belief? Evidentialists argue that there cannot be any such reasons. Putative practical reasons for belief are not reasons for belief, but reasons to manage our beliefs in a particular way. Pragmatists are not convinced. They accept that some reasons for belief are practical. The debate, it is widely thought, is at an impasse. But this debate (...) fails to address what is puzzling and interesting about the cases. By focusing on reasons for belief, the debate completely overlooks the role of action in relation to belief. We should be talking about the reasons for actions that shape our beliefs, which I will call belief management. I argue for three related theses: the interesting cases that motivate the debate are about belief management; Evidentialism is irrelevant to belief management; agents have practical reasons to manage their beliefs with the aim of forming true beliefs. These reasons are categorical in nature and result in the tension of conflict cases. (shrink)

Apresentamos os conceitos de inércia, espaço e tempo na mecânica newtoniana. Analisamos o princípio de Mach, segundo o qual a inércia de qualquer corpo é devida a sua interação com os corpos distantes do universo. Em seguida explicamos porque, em geral, a teoria da gravitação de Einstein não implementa este princípio. Discutimos então o trabalho de Erwin Schrödinger que apresenta uma formulação alternativa para a mecânica baseada numa lei de Weber para a gravitação e que é compatível com as idéias (...) de Mach. (shrink)

Рассматривается понимание как специфически человеческий способ существования, как первичный, исходный опыт освоения человеком мира, в котором отсутствует субъект-объективная разделенность, лежащая в основе познавательного отношения. Для специалистов.

Construction and Schemata in Mathematics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4..

In this paper, I argue for a conditional parity thesis: if we are agents with respect to our intentions, we are agents with respect to our beliefs. In the final section, I motivate a categorical version of the parity thesis: we are agents with respect to belief and intention. My aim in this paper is to show that there is no unique challenge facing epistemic agency that is not also facing agency with respect to intention. My thesis is ambitious on (...) two fronts. First, the parity thesis is a substantive thesis about the nature of belief and intention. I argue that there is a structural parity of belief and intention; the status of whether they are agential stands and falls together. Second, the parity thesis illuminates the nature of agency. It constrains what counts as a satisfactory account of agency: either we must accept agency of both belief and intention, or we must reject both. In the final section, I argue that we have prima facie reason to accept agency of belief and intention. Finally, I diagnose why there has been such resistance to epistemic agency. Epistemic agency is problematic, but its problems are problems with agency, not problems with epistemic agency. (shrink)